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T
he FOMC has attempted to reduce longer-term
interest rates both by stating its intentions about
the future path of the federal funds rate, called
forward guidance, and by buying substantial quantities of
longer-term assets, through what is referred to as quantitative
easing. This essay discusses a potential conflict between
these two methods of affecting longer-term interest rates
and suggests that the FOMC could increase communication
and transparency by clearly stating why it is following this
two-pronged approach.
In recent years the FOMC has increasingly used forward
guidance in an attempt to have a greater effect on yields of
longer-maturity securities. The FOMC first adopted this
approach in 2003 by stating that “policy accommodation
can be maintained for a considerable period.”1 Since
December 2008, forward guidance has come in the form of
the FOMC’s statement that the federal funds rate is likely
to remain exceptionally low for an extended period.
A theoretical basis for forward guidance is the expecta-
tions hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates (EH),
which asserts that the long-term rate is equal to the market’s
expectation of the average short-term rate over the holding
period of the long-term asset; added to this average is a
constant risk premium associated with the fact that longer-
term securities have a higher degree of market risk than
shorter-term securities.2 Changes in the FOMC target for
the overnight federal funds rate affect longer-term interest
rates to the extent that market participants expect that the
change in the funds rate will persist. For example, assume
the EH holds and market participants expect the FOMC’s
target for the funds rate to remain at, say, 5 percent for at
least a year. In this case, the rate on an otherwise equivalent
1-year bond would be 5.3 percent: that is, 5 percent due to
the market’s expectation of the overnight funds rate and
0.3 percent due to the risk premium. If the FOMC were to
unexpectedly reduce its target for the funds rate from 5
percent to 4 percent and the market expected the FOMC
to maintain the target there for at least a year, the 1-year
rate would immediately drop to 4.3 percent. However, if
the market expected the FOMC to increase the target back
to 5 percent in six months, the 1-year rate would decrease
to only 4.8% (1/2 [4.0 + 5.0] + 0.3). Under this same assump-
tion, the yield on a 2-year comparable bond would decline
less, a 3-year bond even less, and so on and so forth.
If the EH is true, the longer the period of time that the
market expects the FOMC to keep the funds rate at its new
level, the larger will be the effect of a change in the FOMC’s
funds rate target on longer-term interest rates. So, one inter-
pretation of the announcement that the funds rate is likely
to be in the range of zero to ¼ percent for an “extended
period” is that the FOMC hopes to reduce longer-term
yields in accordance with the EH.
More recently, the Fed has attempted to reduce longer-
term interest rates directly by purchasing large quantities
of longer-term securities. In late 2008 Bernanke (2008)
hinted at this possibility, noting that “the Fed could pur-
chase longer-term Treasury or agency securities on the
open market in substantial quantities. This approach might
influence the yields on these securities, thus helping to
spur aggregate demand.”3 He noted further that it was
encouraging that the Fed’s announced plan to purchase up
to $100 billion in agency debt and up to $500 billion in
agency MBS “was met by a decline in mortgage rates.” On
March 18, 2009, the FOMC announced its intentions to
purchase up to $1.75 trillion in longer-term securities and
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The FOMC’s two-pronged approach involves a potential
conflict: The forward guidance approach assumes perfect
(or at least a high degree of) substitutability across the
maturity structure, while the quantitative easing approach
assumes a low degree of substitutability due to segmentation
of markets across the maturity structure. The difference
can be illustrated with a simple example. Assume the EH
holds and the 5-year Treasury yield is 4 percent and the
market expects that the 5-year yield will be 4 percent for
the next five years. Now assume that the 10-year Treasury
yield is 4.2 percent—the average of the current and expected
future 5-year yield plus a 20-basis-point risk premium.
Further assume that the Fed purchases a large quantity of
10-year securities, which initially reduces the 10-year yield
because the quantity purchased is large relative to the exist-
ing stock of 10-year bonds outstanding. As the 10-year yield
falls relative to the 5-year yield, investors have an incentive
to sell 10-year securities and purchase 5-year securities as
the expected return to holding a sequence of two 5-year
bonds is now greater than the return to holding a 10-year
bond. This will cause 10-year bond yields to rise and 5-year
bond yields to fall. Of course, this process will happen
across the maturity spectrum. If the EH holds, the entire
structure of rates will decline but the shape of the structure
determined by risk premiums will be unchanged. How
much the level of the rate structure declines is determined
by the size of the Fed’s purchase of 10-year securities rela-
tive to the total amount of securities outstanding and the
interest elasticity of demand: The larger the relative amount
purchased and/or the more interest inelastic the demand,
the larger the effect.
If the market for 10-year securities is perfectly segmented
from the rest of the market, however, the effect of the Fed’s
purchase of 10-year securities would not spread beyond
the 10-year yield. The reason is that investors who hold
10-year securities prefer that maturity. Hence, they will
not sell 10-year bonds and purchase 5-year bonds in spite
of the economic incentive to do so. Of course, the market
need not be perfectly segmented. Some of the effect of the
purchase of 10-year securities could spread to some degree
to securities in the neighborhood of 10 years, but not across
the entire maturity spectrum. However, if this were the
case, it is not clear how the Fed could affect longer-term
interest rates by committing to keep the funds rate near
zero for an “extended period.” Hence, there is an apparent
conflict between these two approaches to reducing longer-
term yields.
Given the theoretical friction between these two alter-
native approaches to affecting longer-term yields, the FOMC
could reduce uncertainty and greatly improve its communi-
cation and transparency by clearly stating why it is pursuing
both of these approaches simultaneously. One possibility
has been offered by Narayana Kocherlakota, president of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, who suggested
that quantitative easing might represent “another form of
forward guidance about the path of the fed funds rate.”4
This possibility stems from the fact that longer-term secu-
rities have more “interest rate risk” than shorter-term secu-
rities, i.e., their price changes more for any given change
in the interest rate. By holding a relatively large quantity of
longer-term securities, the Fed would suffer a larger capital
loss if it raised interest rates. From this perspective, the
large-scale purchase of longer-term securities could be seen
as a commitment device, designed to enhance the effective-
ness of the FOMC’s forward guidance policy. Whatever
the motivation, the FOMC could reduce uncertainty by
explicitly stating its intentions. ■
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